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Abstract
Who governs in the international organizations (IOs) that promulgate global norms on trade and
commercial law? Using a new analytic approach, this paper focuses on previously invisible
attributes of a global legislature – the state and non-state delegations and delegates that create
universal norms for international trade and commercial law through the most prominent trade law
legislature, the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Based on ten years of
fieldwork, extensive interviews, and unique data on delegation and delegate attendance and par-
ticipation in UNCITRAL’s Working Group on Insolvency, we find that the inner core of global
trade lawmakers at UNCITRAL represent a tiny and unrepresentative subset of state and non-state
actors. This disjunction between UNCITRAL’s public face, which accords with a global norm of
democratic governance, and its private face, where dominant states and private interests prevail,
raises fundamental questions about legitimacy and efficacy of representation in global lawmaking.
Keywords: delegates, delegations, global governance, global lawmaking, international
organizations, international trade law.
1. Introduction
As the global texture of transnational commercial laws grows increasingly dense, the
questions raised by Braithwaite and Drahos (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000), and others, take
on renewed theoretical and pragmatic importance. Who makes the rules governing
international trade and finance? In a global market characterized by radical differences in
economic power, what opportunities are there for weak or poor states or civil society
groups to advance their interests in global lawmaking (de Sousa Santos & Rodríguez-
Garavito 2005; Cohen 2008)? How are business and other non-state stakeholders inte-
grated into the building of the global trade order (Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Black 2008)?
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This article focuses on an understudied and underappreciated genus of international
organizations (IOs) that create global trade law – the transnational quasi-legislatures of
the world that generate new conventions, model laws, legislative guides, and other nor-
mative codes, to govern trade among nations and often the commerce within them. In
these international trade law organizations (ITLOs), representatives of states, and some-
times non-state actors, sit together in a parliament-like chamber over months or years
and produce law-like texts, which the deliberative body intends to be adopted by member
states. We focus on arguably the most influential of these organizations, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and examine closely one
aspect of its politics.1
A black box exists in research on global legislatures, ITLOs, and IOs more generally
(but see Koppell 2010).2 Little is known about the delegations that embody the represen-
tation of state and non-state actors and that craft global norms for international trade in
global legislatures.
This paper focuses on the first and foundational question – the attributes of a
delegation (a formal group given standing in IO deliberations) and the delegates (indi-
viduals) that comprise it.3 We proceed on the premise that delegations and their con-
stituent delegates are the principal means by which states and non-state actors influence
outcomes in global legislatures.4 If they are not present, they exert little influence.
Two questions immediately arise: who is present? And what does “present” mean? We
ransack an original data set on the identity and attributes of delegations and delegates to
answer both questions. We shall demonstrate that being “present” is significantly more
complex that might be supposed. By distinguishing between the attributes of delegations
and delegations, and showing the complex relations between them, we simultaneously
unravel the complexity of attendance and offer methods for delegation analysis that may
be applied to any ITLOs or IOs that rely on deliberative chambers and delegations for the
formulation of global norms.
The article begins with theoretical framings of “who governs” in global lawmaking;
describes UNCITRAL, its proceedings and the data we analyze; presents empirical find-
ings in detail; and concludes with implications of the findings for the fundamental
question of “Who Governs?” To anticipate the conclusion, those who govern global trade
lawmaking are a tiny subset of state delegations and delegates who are heavily skewed
towards the Global North, together with well-organized non-state actors that are also
anchored in advanced economies. While UNCITRAL characterizes its own identity as a
representative body, and emphasizes inclusiveness of states as a foundation of its global
authority, we discover a tiny number of delegates and delegations which comprise the
IO’s deliberative core.
2. Theory
While the significance of delegates, delegations, and their attributes are not directly
addressed in theories of IOs or global normmaking, it is possible to extrapolate from
those theories likely expectations about the participation of delegations and delegates
and, thus, their probable impact. These theories may be broadly divided into those that
emphasize the global economic and geopolitical power of states, and those that also
recognize the distinctive powers of IOs, epistemic communities, and international civil
society.
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On the one hand, world systems’ theorists (Grieco & Ikenberry 2003; Wallerstein
2005) and theorists of international political economy or at least its “Third Generation”
economistic variant (Helleiner 2009) hold views consistent with an expectation that the
delegations with the greatest likely influence on deliberative proceedings will be those
that represent the most powerful trading and banking nations, such as the United States,
Germany, Japan, and Britain; multilateral international financial institutions, such as
regional development banks, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, that
arguably act as agents for powerful states; and international private banking interests. For
these actors, trade lawmaking offers yet another way to tip the global marketplace in a
direction that favors their economic and financial interests.
Similarly, it should follow from realist and neo-realist theory in international rela-
tions that states at the center of the world economy will exercise disproportionate influ-
ence in trade law legislatures. If UNCITRAL’s products were perceived to influence the
financial fortunes of powerful states, then realists would anticipate a minimal impact of
poor or weak states and most non-state actors, a considerable impact of multilateral
bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which might be viewed as an
agent of a powerful state actor, and the strongest impact of states that are geopolitically
influential (Waltz 1979; Gruber 2000; O’Neill et al. 2004; Stone 2011).5
On the other hand, several bodies of theory converge on expectations that IOs,
including global legislatures, will be influenced by actors other than states, and that
ITLOs produce emergent outcomes that cannot be readily extrapolated from the power
of the most powerful states in global markets or politics. Governance theory comes
more closely to bear on the incorporation of diverse constituencies into global lawmak-
ing. Increasingly it emphasizes a normative consensus that has emerged on the necessity
of grounding global authority on a broad-based foundation of legitimacy where states,
publics, and salient parties are integrated into lawmaking (Payne & Samhat 2004; Held
& Koenig-Archibugi 2005). From this perspective it would be predicted that a delibera-
tive process, fully representative of nations and interested non-state actors, would
produce norms with a higher probability of adoption by nation-states and implemen-
tation in actual practice. UNCITRAL, in this scenario, would cultivate a broad-based
representation of state and non-state delegations, including both powerful nations in
the global economy and those for which adoption of global norms might become a
national priority.
For global governance scholarship, as well as much IO theory in general, this embrace
of diverse nations, expertise, and interests easily transposes into the key of political
legitimacy. For some scholars, a co-regulatory approach (Bowman & Hodge 2009) will
produce greater legitimacy and subsequent effectiveness when governments and industry
and experts and civil groups work cooperatively. The legitimacy of hard and soft law relies
on representation and participation. Both require the inputs of a broad range of govern-
ments and experts (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma 2009; Börzel & Risse 2010). Thus,
global organizations can “play a role in constructing their own legitimacy claims” (Black
2008, p. 146), by integrating a diversity of delegations into deliberations where both
representation and participation are manifest.
Constructivist IO theory similarly holds that IOs exert an influence of their own and
are not simply ciphers of powerful states (Barnett & Finnemore 2004).6 Constructivists
would attend to overlaps and cross-cutting ties between delegates and delegations of state
and non-state actors in the expectation that emergent properties of social identity, social
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organization, and interests that transcend any particular actor are likely to be evident in
the deliberative process.
Here, constructivists would find common ground with scholars on international civil
society and professions (Price 2003; Teegen et al. 2004). Part of the dynamic of IO
lawmaking can be expressed through efforts of civil society groups to be admitted to
global deliberations and to be influential once there. Because global policymaking occurs
on issues that are often technically complex, and as lawmaking often privileges legal
experts (Cohen 2008), it should follow that ITLOs will want to import expert bodies into
proceedings, just as professional bodies themselves may seek to mobilize their distinctive
technical authority for global policy formation. A prominent role for professions would
also be predicted by world polity theory on global norms (Meyer et al. 1997).
Both sets of theories hold implications for our assessment of delegations’ capacity for
participation and, ultimately, influence within an ITLO.
For example, realist IR theory, economistic international political economy (IPE)
theory, and world systems theory all emphasize the primacy of the state as the essential
actor on the international stage and diminish, to various degrees, the autonomy or
independence significance of IOs. In this view, the deliberative chamber merely reflects a
microcosm of global realpolitik, of the concentration of wealth and economic power in
the world economy. Delegations would be presumed to be more influential when their
states are at the center of the world economy. Non-state delegations would be presumed
to obtain a derivative influence when they, too, are centered in powerful states or their
delegations are populated by the individuals from those states. Concomitantly, less pow-
erful delegations and ITLO officials would be presumed to defer to more powerful state
and non-state delegations.
The second group of theories (constructivism, cultural IPE, global governance, pro-
fessions) would argue, alternatively, that delegations have discernible properties beyond
mere extrapolations from the power of the states sending delegations or hosting IOs. If
the attributes of states are held relatively constant, such as the economic power of all G-8
states, these theories would predict that there will be consequential variations among the
properties of state delegates and delegations, variations that result in differing participa-
tory capacities and, ultimately, probabilities of influence. Similarly, they would predict
that there will be similarities among the properties of distinct sorts of state delegates and
delegations and, thus, that the wealth or economic power of the state sending the del-
egation need not limit the influence of the delegation. Moreover, constructivist theory
would further ask whether our data hold implications regarding the ITLO – its authority
and legitimacy.
It is, therefore, necessary to isolate those properties of delegates and delegations and
examine whether their variation, even within classes of states or non-state actors, will
likely lead to differential effects on outcomes of an ITLO deliberative body.
3. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to establish its Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law in 1966. In justifying the creation of UNCITRAL, the General Assembly
“Reaffirm[ed] its conviction that divergencies arising from the laws of different States in
matters relating to international trade constitute one of the obstacles to the development
of world trade.” The UN Resolution justified the need for yet another ITLO devoted to
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“the progressive harmonization and unification” of trade law on the grounds that the UN
was uniquely positioned both to provide “broader participation in this field on the part
of many developing countries” and to “co-ordinate, systematize and accelerate” the
“process of harmonization and unification of the law of international trade” (Block-Lieb
& Halliday 2007b, p. 856).7
Over the past 45 years, UNCITRAL has produced conventions, model laws, legislative
guides, and other international instruments on many areas of procedural and substantive
law, including international commercial arbitration and conciliation, e-commerce,
international payments, procurement and infrastructure development, international
transport of goods, secured transactions, and insolvency. The breadth of topics that
UNCITRAL addresses has grown enormously since its inception and numbers of its
products appear to have had a significant impact on national lawmaking and practice. In
some cases, these are international treaties with far-reaching influence on international
trade, such as the Convention on the International Sales of Goods (referred to as the
CISG), which has 78 state signatories or the Convention on the Contracts for the Inter-
national Carriage of Goods, Wholly or Partly by Sea (now known as the Rotterdam
Rules), which promises to become the global standard governing liability for goods
traveling to markets across the world’s oceans. In addition, UNCITRAL’s stature has been
magnified since the Asian financial crisis, when the G-22 set out an ambitious agenda for
domestic reform of financial systems, which UNCITRAL appropriated for itself as the
lead global normmaker in various areas of commercial law, such as insolvency and
secured transactions law.
UNCITRAL’s products are developed through three stages: working groups (WGs), in
which policy decisions and drafting of an instrument take place; the Commission, which
formally sets the substantive agenda of UNCITRAL and approves products from WGs; and
the UN General Assembly, which ratifies Commission decisions, usually with congratula-
tions and no substantive amendment. Representation could, in principle, be incorporated
into any of the three stages and, indeed, forms UNCITRAL’s principal claim to legitimacy.
In practice, both the WG and the Commission are constituted as representative bodies. The
General Assembly, fully representative of the world’s nations, caps the deliberative process
by placing its powerful symbolic imprimatur on UNCITRAL products.
The Commission has a Secretariat, based in Vienna, comprised of some 20 legal
experts (former private practitioners, judges, law professors, legal civil servants). Drawn
principally from advanced economies, UNCITRAL’s lawyer–civil servants have dual
responsibilities: several have Commission-wide responsibilities for coordinating techni-
cal assistance; all serve WGs as the primary drafters of WG texts, recorders of all delib-
erative proceedings, convenors of expert consultations between official WG meetings, and
exponents of completed products for global dissemination. Between meetings, delegates
and secretaries of WGs may convene informal expert groups to review drafts or propose
new drafting language.
There are currently six active UNCITRAL WGs, whose topics range from insolvency
and secured transactions to electronic commerce, procurement, online dispute resolu-
tion, and international arbitration and conciliation. Each WG sits as a global deliberative
body for one or two weeks twice a year in Vienna and New York. Although they could
decide matters by majority vote, WGs have, since UNCITRAL’s inception, deliberated on
the basis of “consensus.” WGs are comprised of three classes of delegations: 60 state
delegations from the current members of the Commission; all other states that are invited
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as observer state delegations; and non-state delegations, invited at the discretion of the
Secretariat, and which usually comprise international industry and expert groups with
special interest in the topic (Block-Lieb & Halliday 2006). The presiding chair treats all
three classes of delegations alike during proceedings, although decisions are made by state
delegations only. Once translated into the six official UN languages, draft documents
from WG sessions are posted on the UNICTRAL website for delegates and any other
interested party to review before (or after) WG sessions.
The Commission, in consultation with the Secretariat, determines the focus of the
Commission’s broad topical agenda, which is reflected in the general programs of work
by the six WGs. While the Commission sets a WG mandate, the scope and focus of
particular programs of the groups’ work tends to emerge from within WGs themselves,
usually as a consensus view of WG deliberations, in consultation with the WG Secretary
and the UNCITRAL Secretary. The Commission, often with little emendation, conven-
tionally endorses the specific work product emanating from WGs.
4. Data
This study relies on data collected during an intensive case study of one of UNCITRAL’s
most active WGs – Working Group V on insolvency law (Block-Lieb & Halliday 2007a,b;
Halliday & Carruthers 2009). Of UNCITRAL’s six WGs currently in action, WG V has
been notable for its rapid drafting and adoption of a Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency (the Model Law) in 1997 (UNCITRAL 1997) and its completion of a Legis-
lative Guide on Insolvency Law in 2004 (UNCITRAL 2004), a practice guide for cross-
border cooperation by judges in 2009 (UNCITRAL 2009), a 2010 addendum to the
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law to cover the treatment of enterprise groups (UNCI-
TRAL 2010), and a statement on judicial perspectives on the Model Law (UNCITRAL
2011).
Our data are drawn from three sources on the drafting of the Legislative Guide. First,
from 1999 to 2004 the WG V met eight times for a week at a time, usually twice a year,
once in Vienna and once in New York at the UN. We have analyzed all attendance data of
delegates and delegations at those meetings, including type of delegation (state/non-
state, advanced/developing/transitional country), name of delegate, occupation of del-
egate, and ministry from which state delegates are sent. Second, two of the authors
observed six of the eight sessions, compiling a record of all speakers and speech-turns,
and conducted extensive formal and informal interviews over eight years with delegates
and UNCITRAL staff. Third, we have analyzed in detail the substantive content and
formal structure of the final product – the Legislative Guide on Insolvency (Block-Lieb &
Halliday 2006). This article relies primarily on the first set of data – on attributes of
delegations and delegates – although we also refer briefly to the second set and draw upon
the substantive outcomes in our concluding observations.
Attendance of delegations and delegates is not a simple matter. Two delegations, for
instance, might attend a majority of sessions, but their profiles of attendance differ
sharply. In one, a delegation attends all consecutive sessions at the beginning, middle, or
end of deliberations and, thereby, builds up incremental knowledge and experience about
decisions and directions that form the basis for subsequent discussions and decisionmak-
ing. In another, a delegation attends a time or two, misses one or two sessions, returns for
a session, misses another, returns again, and so on. In the latter case, delegations cannot
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participate as effectively. Even if they have taken extraordinary steps to inform themselves
of what transpired in their absence, their absences diminish their integration into a
normmaking community, and attenuate the ties and trust that frequently build up among
key normmakers during negotiations.
To some degree, the attributes of delegations and delegates vary independently of
each other. Because social relationships occur more naturally among individuals than
among groups, the likely influence of a delegation depends importantly on the consis-
tency of attendance by delegates within a delegation. For example, it is possible for a
delegation (a formal group) to be present at every session, but for its constituent delegates
(the people who comprise the group) to turn over completely. In that case, consistency of
a delegation’s attendance matters relatively little because each new delegate must begin
learning from the outset and has little experience to draw upon, even if well briefed by a
previously attending peer. Certainly such delegates will have more attenuated relation-
ships with other delegates and the Secretariat. As a result, it can be expected that consis-
tent delegations that also include delegates whose own attendance is consistent are more
likely to exercise influence on normmaking outcomes.
Further, the extent and contours of influence are likely to reflect who the delegates are
within a delegation. This is partly a matter of delegation size and partly of delegation
composition.
Participatory impact relates to backgrounds and life experiences of individual del-
egates who can speak with more or less authority based on their career trajectories and
current occupational statuses. WG V deliberated on the contours of corporate insolvency
law, a topic that involves detailed legal and financial considerations embedded in larger
social and political decisions about which interests to preserve and which to jettison in
the context of a firm’s financial distress. In the insolvency field, at least, lawmakers might
include not only legislators, civil servants, and judges, but lawyers, accountants, and
insolvency practitioners who preside over everyday implementation of global norms.
Hence, it can be expected that a delegation might increase its impact if its membership is
occupationally diverse, that is, if it includes specialists from both the public and private or
state and non-state sectors. This will be most salient for state delegations, but it may also
strengthen non-state delegations, where, for instance, a judge or law professor comple-
ments a private practitioner.
Closely related is an indicator of density. Each delegation is permitted four members.
The more consistently a delegation brings a more diverse group of stakeholders in
lawmaking and implementation, the greater its probable impact should be.
These attributes of delegations and delegates can vary independently. For maximal
impact, however, it might be anticipated that the delegations that combine attributes will
magnify their influence. Consistent with this expectation, the strongest probable influ-
ence of a delegation qua delegation8 will combine (i) high and consecutive attendance of
delegations; (ii) high and consecutive attendance of particular delegates; (iii) the con-
junction of consistently attending delegates and delegations; (iv) occupationally diverse
delegations; and (v) full or dense delegations. Put another way, influence will be dimin-
ished, as each of these properties may be lost to a delegation.
We examine data in turn on (i) attributes of delegations; (ii) attributes of delegates;
(iii) combinations of delegation and delegate attributes; (iv) the density and diversity of
delegations; and (v) cumulative combinations of these factors. We conclude by specifying
which delegations dominated the process of deliberations in UNCITRAL’s WG V and
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then examine the correspondence between this finding and findings reported elsewhere
on other UNCITRAL WGs.
5. Findings
5.1. Delegations
UNCITRAL invites three broad categories of delegations. First, at the core are the 36
(until 2004) and later 60 (2004 and thereafter) states that are members of the UNCITRAL
Commission. Official state delegations come from a representative sampling of the
world’s regions and levels of economic and legal development. Under the terms of
UNCITRAL’s original mandate, member states are selected by lot, subject to “the
adequate representation of the principal economic and legal systems of the world and of
developed and developing countries,”9 and serve for staggered six-year terms.
Second, UNICTRAL’s Secretariat invites all other states that are members of the
General Assembly to WG sessions as observer states. Observer states attend and partici-
pate on exactly the same terms as UNCITRAL member states. In WG V, approximately 10
to 20 observer nations attended regularly.
Third, the UNCITRAL Secretariat seeks representation from international industry
groups, multilateral organizations, and other trade bodies that have a putative interest in
these particular trade law proceedings. The interest groups that attended the WG on
Insolvency fell into four classes: (i) international financial institutions (e.g. IMF, World
Bank); (ii) international economic governance organizations (e.g. Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Common Market for Easter and South
Africa [COMESA]); (iii) international professional associations of lawyers and insolvency
practitioners (e.g. International Bar Association [IBA], the International Federation of
Insolvency Practitioners [INSOL], the International Insolvency Institute [III], and an
international section of the American Bar Association [ABA]); and (iv) ITLOs, such as
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) or the Hague
Conference on International Private Law.
As in national lawmaking, certain interests were not directly represented in the WG:
although invited, representatives of business, such as the International Chamber of
Commerce, did not attend; representatives of labor (the International Labour Organi-
zation) were invited, but only attended once; and trade creditors had no direct
representation.10
Non-governmental organizations accepting the Secretariat’s invitation can attend
and participate effectively on nearly the same terms as state delegations. The Chair
recognizes requests to intervene in the order in which flags are raised; in judging whether
a consensus had been reached, however, the Chair may ignore non-state delegates’
requests for changed language unless seconded by a state delegation.
Our data show that 127 delegations attended WG V at least once, but 70 of these
attended only once or twice, and only 36 attended more than half the sessions. We define
these 36 as “high attendance delegations.” Even fewer, only 24, have near perfect atten-
dance, coming seven to eight times. It is likely that brief attendance serves a scanning or
oversight function. A quick appraisal of proceedings enables diplomats at the permanent
missions in New York or Vienna to prioritize their commitments to UN-related proceed-
ings. It also permits delegations to take the pulse of the WG and decide whether the
subject matter area merits passive monitoring or active involvement.
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Who are the High-attendance delegations? Numerically and proportionately, Table 1
indicates that advanced economies and Developing/transitional economies are about
evenly balanced among the state delegations in attendance (16 advanced to 13
developing/transitional). Most of the delegations from developing/transitional countries
attend five or six times and are, thus, concentrated at the lower end in the frequency of
high-attending delegations. Six of these are disproportionately big economies and enjoy
membership in the G-20: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey. Developing/
transitional delegations come from all regions of the world.
All the high-attendance delegations that are non-state actors are either international
financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) or professional associations (IBA, III, ABA,
INSOL, and Groupe de Réflexion sur L’insolvabilité et sa Prévention [known as GRIP]).
The international financial institutions (IFIs) attended partly because UNCITRAL pro-
ceedings built on their prior normmaking (Halliday & Carruthers 2009, ch 3), and partly
because they have mandates to evaluate and promulgate norms for insolvency systems
across their member countries. The professional associations represent the greatest con-
centrations of insolvency expertise in INGOs among lawyers, accountants, and insol-
vency practitioners.
When non-state actors are included, which are all based in countries with advanced
economies, the numerical and disproportionate balance tips in favor of advanced econo-
mies (23 advanced to 13 developing/transitional). Whether advanced or developing
economies, however, the high-attenders do represent most of the world’s largest econo-
mies. Their states account for more than 50 percent of world gross domestic product
(GDP).
5.2. Delegates
The overall number of delegates who attend at least once is very high (n = 559). However,
almost three-quarters of these delegates come only once or, in an unknown number of
cases, they signal to UNCITRAL that they intend to attend, but do not appear at all. In
part, the record for those that do appear at least once can be attributed to the scanning or
surveillance function of permanent mission diplomats in Vienna and New York. When
only delegates who are not part of UN missions are considered, the overall number of
delegates drops from 559 to 333. Even then the distribution remains quite similar: more
than 80 percent of delegates come only once or twice.
Table 1 High-attendance delegations
Advanced Developing/transitional
State Australia (8), South Korea (8), Switzerland
(8), Germany (8), Spain (8), Sweden (8),
Canada (8), France (7), Austria (7), Italy
(7), Japan (7), Singapore (7), USA (7),
Denmark (6), Ireland (6), & the UK (6)
Thailand (8), Mexico (7), China (7),
India (6), Russia (6), Philippines (6),
Turkey (6), Brazil (5), Cameroon (5),
Iran (5), Nigeria (5), Sudan (5), &
Turkey (5)
(16 total) (13 total)
Non-state IMF (8), IBA (8), INSOL (8), WB (7),
ABA (7), GRIP (7), & III (7)
(7 total)
Note: “High attendance” indicates a delegation that sent at least one representative to more than half
of the UNCITRAL meetings (i.e. five or more meetings).
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The data also show that a tiny proportion – about 5–10 percent (n = 27) – attend more
than half of the time and only 12 attend virtually every session (seven to eight times). This
finding brings us much closer to delegates at the core of the deliberative body.
It is instructive to examine the 27 most consistent, high-attendance delegates (who
attended more than half the sessions) (Table 2). These high-attendance delegates are
overwhelmingly from advanced economies. Several delegations have more than one
consistent delegate (US, INSOL, IBA, ABA, GRIP), with the professional associations
preponderant. The single highest concentration of consistent delegates is the US delega-
tion (four). If we classify delegates by country of citizenship/domicile, the countries with
the highest number of consistent delegates are the US (nine of 27, 33 percent), France
(three), UK (two), and Canada (two).
Regional combinations are revealing: there is a strong North American contingent
(US, Canada), a strong British Commonwealth presence (UK, Canada, Australia), a
strong EU contingent (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain), but weak Latin
American, Asian, Australasian, and African contingents. Considerable balance can be
observed between common law delegations (ABA, Australia, Canada, the US, UK) and
civil law delegations (France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Spain, South Korea, GRIP,
Colombia).
5.3. Delegations plus delegates
The delegations with the highest capacity for influence are likely to be those high-
attendance delegations with delegates whose personal attendance is high. However, there
are two different profiles of delegate/delegation attendance.
One has a high turnover of delegates within delegations. Analysis reveals that the
turnover of delegates in many delegations is high indeed. By defining the unit of analysis
as a person/session,11 11 of the high-attendance delegations experience between 20 and 42
person/session attendances. Surprisingly, high numbers come not only from countries
with advanced economies, but from countries with developing or transitional economies,
most notably China, Colombia, Thailand, and Cameroon, which between them rate some
Table 2 High-attendance delegates (n = 27)
Advanced Developing/transitional
State Andrew Sellars (Australia), Jean-Luc Vallens (France),
Stephan Guido (Germany), Myer Sigal (USA), Harold
Burman (USA), Burton Lifland (USA), Tina Brozman
(USA), Junichi Matsushit (Japan), Annie Drymala
(Canada), Lucio Ghia (Italy), Alexander Markus
(Switzerland), David Moran Bovio (Spain), Soo-Geun





Non-state Neil Cooper (INSOL), Ronald Harmer (INSOL), Ben Floyd
(IBA), Daniel Glosband (IBA), Bruce Leonard (III),
Susan Block-Lieb (ABA), Chris Redmond (ABA),
Gordon Johnson (WB), Adolfo Rouillon (WB), Isabelle
Didier (GRIP), Marc Andre (GRIP) (11)
Note: “High attendance” indicates a delegate who attended more than half of the UNCITRAL
meetings (i.e. five or more meetings).
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115 person/session attendances at the WG. There are at least two explanations: On the
one hand, some countries choose to expose a larger number of their officials to interna-
tional negotiations as a form of socialization in global lawmaking and education. That
is, they are there to learn, not to draft. On the other hand, there is imputation, not
always undeserved, that some countries use attendance at UN meetings as a kind of
UN-tourism, a reward of a foreign trip at state expense for privileged officials.
A second profile combines high-attending delegations with their most consistent
delegates. Table 3 reveals that a tiny number of delegations combine both high attendance
and high consistency: Thailand, INSOL, Australia, IBA, Germany, World Bank, US, Japan,
III, and France attended either eight out of eight, seven out of eight or seven out of seven
times. These 10 delegations either had the same delegate present for every session or every
session but one. Except for Thailand, all are from advanced economies. Four of the ten of
the most active, consistent delegations are NGOs or IFIs. On proportional grounds, then,
advanced economies overwhelm and non-state actors, principally professional associa-
tions, are disproportionally active. When we compare types of delegations by the average
number of meetings attended by the most consistent delegate, the gap between advanced
countries (5.4 sessions out of 8), INGOs (6.6/8) and developing/transitional countries
(3.2/8) becomes more apparent. On average, in the high-attendance delegations from
developing/transitional countries, the most consistent delegate came to fewer than half of
the WGs meetings.
In sum, the combined data on high-attendance delegations and high-attendance
consistent delegates indicate that a small number of delegations and delegates lies at the
core of WG proceedings. These delegations have the highest likely capacity for influence
over global normmaking.
5.4. Density and diversity in delegations
We have identified high-attendance delegations, high-attendance and high-Consistency
delegates, and combinations of the two. However, delegations might strengthen their
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influence in other ways. A delegation might add depth to its bench by consistently
bringing several delegates to each meeting. These delegates might complement each
other’s experiences, skills, and perspectives. We define such a high-density delegation as a
delegation that regularly sent three or more persons to each meeting. This does not
signify that each delegate attended consistently nor does it say anything about their
attributes.
Table 4 shows that approximately half of the high-attendance delegations had a high
density of delegates. High-density delegations were preponderantly from advanced
economies (Europe, East Asia, US) and the professions (III, INSOL, IBA). Yet four
developing and two transitional countries also had high-density delegations.
Our data also enable us to specify the variety in backgrounds of delegates in high-
density delegations. If a state delegation incorporates different backgrounds, skills, and
experiences from different parts of the insolvency system – judges as well as practitioners,
officials from lawmaking ministries or regulatory agencies as well as professors – it can
increase its authority in the deliberative process, enrich the discourse around normmak-
ing, and become more persuasive. For simplicity, we divide high-attendance delegations
into high-diversity and low-diversity delegations. We find that advanced economies
(Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, US) are more likely to
bring diverse delegations and that civil law countries do so more often than common law
countries, except for the US. Several non-state delegations also have diverse delegations
(III, INSOL, World Bank).
5.5. Cumulative impact of attributes
When we compare those delegations that combine high attendance with high delegate
consistency and diversity we observe a striking convergence on a very small number of
delegations and delegates. In Table 5, Column 1 (High attendance, High consistency),
just 10 delegations combine both. If we examine which of those delegations also have
a higher density of delegates (Column 2), we see the same delegations (i.e. Germany,
IBA, US, III, INSOL, Japan, Thailand, World Bank),with the exception of Australia and
France, which consistently sent just one delegate. Similarly, if we observe which high-
attending/high-consistency delegations were also high diversity-delegations (Column
3), it can be seen again that the overlap is very substantial – indeed, 7 of the same 10
delegations. Finally, since we have identified the 27 highest-attending delegates, we
can observe which coincide with delegations that score highly on other attributes. It
will be seen (Column 4) that 16 of the highest attending delegates are within this
cluster.
Table 4 High-density delegations among high-attendance delegations
Advanced Developing/transitional
State Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, USA (7/16)
Cameroon, China, Colombia, Russia,
Sudan, Thailand (6/13)
Non-state IBA, III, INSOL, the World Bank (4/7)
Notes: “High attendance” indicates a delegation that sent at least one representative to more than
half of the UNCITRAL meetings (i.e. five or more meetings).
“High density” indicates those sending three or more delegates to meeting.
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6. Delegations, participation, and outcomes
6.1. Summary of findings
We find that large numbers of delegations (127) and delegates (559) attended UNCI-
TRAL’s Working Group on Insolvency at least once, but a small number of delegations
(36) and smaller number of delegates (12–27) formed its working core. The high-
attending, highly consistent delegations were predominantly from advanced economies;
they represented a diversity of national approaches to bankruptcy; and they included
both state and non-state actors. The high-attending delegates were overwhelmingly from
advanced economies and substantially from professional NGOs and IFIs. Most economi-
cally powerful states (US, Germany, Japan, UK, China, France, etc.) sent delegations
consistently, indicating that UNCITRAL matters to them enough to warrant the invest-
ments that frequent and consistent attendance requires.
A handful of delegations (Australia, France, Germany, IBA, III, INSOL, Japan, Thai-
land, World Bank, US) appeared best positioned to participate effectively because they
combined: high attendance of delegations; high consistency of delegations; high density
of delegations; high diversity of delegations; and high consistency of delegates. The US
combined these attributes of delegations and delegates most markedly. Moreover, US
citizens comprised the largest number of individual delegates (9 of 26); and a
US-centered cluster of state and non-state actors formed something of a like-minded bloc
(US, IBA, ABA, World Bank). Nevertheless, the core delegations do represent a variety of
alternative insolvency systems in advanced economies. Together with a small number of
high-attending delegates (12), this cluster of delegations and delegates was best posi-
tioned to form the nucleus of influential normmakers.
It appears that few principals of state or non-state delegations either considered it
worthwhile or could afford consistently to send delegations to most meetings. The con-
trast between the total number of delegates who attended and those who attended
consistently is even more pronounced. By default, therefore, the delegation and delegate
data suggest that global norms for insolvency were shaped by a tiny number/cluster of
delegations and delegations unrepresentative of the diversity of economies, regions, or
Table 5 Combinations of attributes: high-attendance delegation, high-consistency delegation,







High attendance + High
consistency plus
High density High diversity High attending delegate
Australia Australia
France France
Germany Germany Germany Germany
IBA IBA IBA (2)
III III III III
INSOL INSOL INSOL INSOL (2)
Japan Japan Japan Japan
Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand
World Bank World Bank World Bank World Bank (2)
US US US US (4)
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varieties of law in the world. Our qualitative evidence, reported elsewhere, shows that
delegations had no influence on drafting if they did not attend regularly.12
If powerful state and non-state delegations hope to influence proceedings, they will
attend the proceedings, consistently, in force, and with delegates from diverse back-
grounds. The data show that the high-attendance delegations disproportionately are
from economically powerful states, such as the US, France, Japan and Germany, and
powerful IOs, such as the World Bank. It is clear from the size and consistency of the
attendance of these delegations that their principals did not suppose that UNCITRAL
would produce norms to their liking without effective representation and participation.
They presumed attendance mattered and acted accordingly. Their consistent, expanded
presence also demonstrates that UNCITRAL’s normmaking in this field mattered to
them, whether for domestic consumption, but more probably, for reasons of interna-
tional trade competitiveness. Nonetheless, a small number of developing and transitional
countries (China, Thailand, Colombia) also positioned themselves to field strong del-
egations by one or another measure. China was in the process of drafting a comprehen-
sive bankruptcy law and putting into place a corporate bankruptcy system; Colombia
sent its Commissioner of Corporate Affairs, responsible for the entire bankruptcy
system, as its lead delegate, again with the expectation that Colombia might be revising
its laws.
Professions integral to corporate bankruptcies had a powerful interest in the estab-
lishment of laws and regimes consistent with their expertise and competitive advantage.
Non-state delegations from international professional associations maintained a strong
presence, often through delegates with consistent attendance records and sometimes with
a diverse range of such delegates.
6.2. Participation
Presence per se does not confer influence. It is conceivable that a delegate with a perfect
attendance record or a delegation with density and diversity contributed little or nothing
to deliberations. Although we do not have comprehensive data on participation during
proceedings, we can report tentatively on incomplete data.
In four of the eight WG sessions from 1999 to 2002, we coded every speaker in each
session in the order in which they spoke (Halliday & Carruthers 2003). Each intervention
or “speech-turn” is counted as one participation. We found that six of the 10 high-
attendance delegations whose delegates attended frequently and consistently were also
the delegations with the greatest number of speech turns. The delegations from France
and the US intervened the most; together they account for almost one-quarter of the total
interventions recorded. Otherwise, it was the professional associations (IBA, III, INSOL)
that were both frequent and consistent attenders and that participated extensively; 26
percent of all speech-turns come from just four professional associations (ABA, IBA, III,
INSOL). Thus, only six delegations accounted for more than 50 percent of all interven-
tions. Obversely, four of the delegations that attended frequently and consistently (Japan,
Germany, Thailand, World Bank) did not participate at anything like the levels that their
delegation/delegate attributes might predict.
Speech-turn data, of course, do not account for content or rhetoric. Moreover, the
data do not exhaust varieties of participation, many of which occur outside formal
sessions. These include informal caucusing in corridors, attendance at expert group
meetings at the invitation of the WG Secretary, annotations on drafts prepared by the WG
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Secretary, among others. Nevertheless, the conjunction of delegation attributes with
delegation participation rates sharpens and narrows expectations about which delega-
tions likely exerted most impact on the final product. Those were the US and France and
the professional associations of lawyers and insolvency practitioners.
Moreover, the potential for influence by delegations from rich economies and of
professions is multiplied by crossovers. Rich countries obtain additional, effective, de
facto representation when citizens participate in non-state delegations and the costs of
those participations are externalized to the non-state bodies. Similarly, professions may
be “double-represented” when they sit both in their non-state delegations and comprise
one or more delegates in state delegations.13
6.3. Other working groups
Are the patterns these data display unique to corporate bankruptcy law and WG V on
Insolvency? To obtain comparisons, we collected comparable data from a cognate area of
domestic law, secured transactions, and its WG VI; and from a long-established but
contrasting body of international law, carriage of goods by sea in international transport
law, and its WG III. Preliminary findings show significant similarity in patterns of del-
egation and delegate representation and participation.
In WG III on international transport law, 149 delegations attended at least once, but
only 56 were high-attending; 739 delegates attended at least once, but only 50 were
high-attending. Only 21 delegations also had high-attending delegates (the comparable
number for Insolvency was 10). In that sense, the WG III core group was twice as large as
that of the Insolvency WG V, but, nonetheless tiny in comparison to the 149 delegations
that appeared at least once in WG III. One significant difference can be observed between
these two WGs. Whereas high-attendance delegations were predominately from advanced
economies in WG V deliberations on insolvency, more balance was evident in the inter-
national transport WG III, where 30 of the 56 high-attendance delegations were from
advanced economies and 26 from developing and transitional economies. Moreover, in the
final negotiating sessions of WG III a powerful African bloc of states emerged to demand
significant concessions in their states’ interests, a phenomenon not seen in the insolvency
or secured transaction WGs. Like insolvency lawmaking, however, international transport
lawmaking also relied substantially on non-state delegations. A non-state delegation
(Comité Maritime International) produced the first draft of a convention for the WG and
11 non-state delegations, most industry groups, participated extensively in proceedings.
In WG VI on secured transactions law, 161 delegations attended at least once, but only
41 were high-attending; 473 delegates attended at least once, but only 30 were high-
attending. Remarkably, in identical numbers to insolvency, there were only 10 high-
attending delegates in high-attending delegations and these were entirely from advanced
economies, with North America (US, Canada) dominating. Unlike insolvency, however,
almost half of the high-attending delegations were from developing and transitional
economies. Like insolvency, and arguably even more intensively than insolvency, expert
professional and industry delegations played a critical role in proceedings (Cohen 2008;
McCormack 2011).
7. Conclusion
These data on delegations and delegates shed light on an invisible component of a much
larger whole – the inner circles of global legislatures. Concomitantly, they offer a partial
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answer to the fundamental problem of who crafts global norms, and present a method-
ological approach for predicting the final shape of those norms.
Consistent with the cluster of theories emphasizing state power and economic inter-
ests, we find that the economies at the center of the world system are also at the core of
deliberations on global norms governing trade and finance. That deliberative core
includes a bloc centered on at least several of the world’s leading economies – US, France,
Germany, Japan, and Australia. Thus, the centrality to proceedings of these powerful
states lends support to putative realist views that would imagine UNCITRAL to be a
forum for geopolitically influential states.
Another cluster of theories we proposed (constructivism, cultural IPE, global gover-
nance, professions) would be more sympathetic to the expectation that delegations and
delegates within IOs, and indeed IOs themselves, exert an influence that can reinforce or
confound measures of state power. Contrast France and the US with the other three
major economies in the inner core of delegations/delegates to UNCITRAL’s WG on
Insolvency. Japan and Germany, while seated at the table of the most frequent attenders,
said little or nothing during proceedings or through informal channels outside the UN
chamber. In other words, attributes of the delegates and delegations of these several
advanced economies led to widely varying degrees of participation and influence.
This cluster of theories points to the likely influence of professions and other non-
state actors. Attendance data and supporting qualitative evidence demonstrate that the
three delegations of professionals (IBA, INSOL, and III), which shared collegial training
and practice with most delegates in the other most participatory delegations, were argu-
ably the critical technical drivers of the deliberative process. They attended consistently
and with a large and diverse group of delegates; they intervened frequently, and, not least,
they held the ear of the US delegation.
What are the implications of these findings for the legitimacy of this global
legislature?
UNCITRAL, like other global lawmaking bodies, must constantly tend to its legiti-
macy on the reasonable premise that global authority stems from a belief by nations and
interested parties that it is representative in composition, fair in proceedings, and effective
in previous lawmaking (Hurd 2007). On its face, UNCITRAL’s potential inclusiveness of
all states and many non-state actors appears to democratize global lawmaking and estab-
lish political legitimacy, as governance normative theory would advocate. UNCITRAL
brought a diverse array of states and a substantial array of non-state actors in the door of
this WG at least once. UNCITRAL also managed to integrate several non-state actors –
the three professional associations and the World Bank – whose expertise and subsequent
sponsorship might prove decisive in drafting, adoption, and implementation.
In practice, however, the delegation/delegate analysis shows that the promise of
representativeness, which would carry heavy political legitimacy, falters when actual
attendance and participation are measured more precisely. Not only do our data show
that WG V was populated predominately by a few powerful countries at the core of the
world economy, but they also indicate the “double representation” of these countries
through the inclusion of professional and IO non-state actors that themselves were
hosted by a very few countries (UK, US, Canada), from the same core of the world
economy.
But legitimacy rests upon perception. By this account, UNCITRAL’s perceived repre-
sentativeness may matter more than whether a representative cross-section of nations –
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by whatever measure – in fact attended a majority of WG sessions through a broad range
of delegates who themselves attended WG sessions with frequency and consistency. If the
frequent attendance of some transitional/developing countries can be viewed as a vote of
confidence in UNCITRAL deliberations, perhaps the legitimacy of an IO depends more
on whether an opportunity to be heard is offered than whether this opportunity is, in fact,
exercised by a broad range of state delegations.
In this paper we have specified very precisely, and to a greater degree than has
previously been the case, those attributes of delegations and delegates that affect their
profiles of participation. That participation underwrites their bids to influence global
lawmaking. We have seen that the drafting in WG V predominately was in the hands of a
tiny handful of state and non-state delegations from advanced economies.
Does this finding predict whose norms prevailed? To answer this question we step
beyond the current paper to our wider findings reported elsewhere.14 The preponderance
of advanced economy actors in the delegations provides fuel to the conclusion that yet
again the world’s most powerful economies and their technical specialists imposed a
solution on the remainder of the world. There is evidence from our interviews and
participant observation that some developing and transitional countries did not believe
their interests were being sufficiently addressed. But this opinion was far from uniform.
And, notwithstanding the fragility of any consensus reached by such a large group, it is
doubtful that delegations from developing/transitional nations could have altered sig-
nificantly the terms of the Legislative Guide, given the relative weakness of their delega-
tions on most of the attributes we measure. Consensus is blocked by raising a formal
objection at a WG session. Most developing nations did not have the resources to counter
consistent, well-staffed delegations, nor the legal capacity effectively to engage specialists
from the Global North on their own grounds (Busch et al. 2008).
At the same time, the Legislative Guide on Insolvency delivers a very substantial
potential benefit to developing countries because its recommendations offer an alterna-
tive route to save companies in the face of hard budget constraints (Carruthers et al.
2001). In their domestic lawmaking, countries as diverse as South Korea, China, and
Brazil embraced the underlying logic of reorganization because it appeared to save jobs
and save businesses (Halliday & Carruthers 2007). The Guide also serves to constrain the
World Bank and IMF; both have agreed that the recommendations set forth in the Guide
constitute international standards for judging insolvency laws around the world and have
incorporated these standards into their Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSC) on insolvency law. While developing countries participated relatively little, there-
fore, it is possible that some decided there was no need to fret the details because the
fundamental reorganization premise of the global norms suited them, so long as it offered
sufficient flexibility to be implemented in ways that fit local circumstances.
In sum, a handful of delegations and delegates from advanced economies and inter-
national professional associations forged an emergent set of norms which coincided with
the underlying fundamental principle common to each of those delegations/delegates in
this nucleus group (viz., rehabilitation of failing businesses where possible), but which
contradicted the substantive law or systemic features of none. Members of the high-
attendance delegations from Mexico, Russia, Germany, Japan, the UK, and China may not
have intervened at WG sessions because they did not need to. Their presence at WG V
sessions maintained a monitoring or protective brief. UNCITRAL was not simply a
cipher through which a single powerful state drove its agenda, but rather a deliberative
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chamber in which first-world nations glossed over their differences in favor of what they
shared in common.
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Notes
1 Other global legislatures in trade law include The International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (known as UNIDROIT) and the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) also work on law-like texts, usually
through expert deliberations.
2 We use the term “international organizations” to encompass transnational normmaking
bodies of all sorts, not the narrower definition of IOs as intergovernmental bodies only.
3 We focus here on a delegation’s formal participation in legislative deliberations, recognizing
that informal and behind-the-scenes participation is both likely to occur and to be effective, a
topic we address in a book-in-progress: Block-Lieb and Halliday, Global Legislators.
4 Of course, in theory it is possible to imagine hidden hands behind the scenes that manipulate
a Secretariat without being present, but our extensive research on UNCITRAL provides no
empirical support for such a theory.
5 In fact, realists might go a step further and argue that delegations of powerful actors at
UNCITRAL are unnecessary because they can get their way elsewhere.
6 Not all constructivists view an IO’s autonomy as conducive to a positive influence in the global
field. Some law and economics scholars, relying on public choice and related theories, admit
the influence of IOs, but view this influence as negative.
7 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Resolution 2205 (XXI),
A/RES/2205(XXI), 17 December 1966, available online at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/005/08/IMG/NR000508.pdf?OpenElement.
8 That is, holding constant the power of the state or non-state actor that sends the delegation.
9 Resolution 2205 (XXI), supra note 10 at Part II, ¶ 1.
10 Although secured creditors were not directly represented in the Working Group, indirect
representation of secured creditors occurred both through international financial institutions
and international professional associations.
11 That is, each time a single person (e.g. the Australian delegate) attends a single session (e.g.
December 2002) this is counted as one attendance. A single person attending all eight sessions
would be counted as eight.
12 Block-Lieb and Halliday, Global Legislators.
13 We are indebted to Carol Heimer for this observation.
14 Block-Lieb and Halliday, Global Legislators.
15 If we relax the criterion of selection (e.g. delegations with high attendance and high
consistency of at least one delegate), we find: (i) most consistent delegate in a high-attendance
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delegation attended six out of eight times: Switzerland, South Korea, Canada; (includes three
of high attendance delegates); (ii) most consistent delegate in a high-attendance delegation
attended six out of seven times: Italy, GRIP, ABA (include five of high-attendance delegates).
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